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CRIMINAL LAW: DEFENDANTS' RIGHTS
INTRODUCTION
The United States Constitution and various federal statutes prescribe the
minimal protections that the government must give to criminal defendants. Al-
though the concept of criminal defendants' rights implicates many aspects of
criminal procedure, this Survey features cases decided by the Tenth Circuit
from September 1995 to September 1996 addressing three specific areas. Part
I examines the relationship between defendants and the judges presiding over
their cases, and the extent to which a defendant may challenge the authority of
a judge. Part II explores the rights of indigent defendants under the Fourteenth
Amendment Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution, as
related to presentence confinement credit resulting from an inability to post
bail. Finally, Part I discusses the various claims made by defendants to in-
yoke the protections of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution
for the purpose of suppressing self-incriminating statements.
I. POWER OF JUDGES OVER DEFENDANTS
A. Background
Criminal defendants have the right to challenge the authority of a trial
judge as required by due process guarantees.' A defendant may move to re-
cuse the judge based on the appearance of bias or prejudice pursuant to either
28 U.S.C. § 144 or § 455,2 or the defendant may, pursuant to the Federal




The Federal Magistrates Act, enacted by Congress in 1968, created the
system of United States Magistrates to replace the United States Commission-
ers.5 Congress viewed the commissioner system as defective in part because
its fee-for-service system restricted its effectiveness by limiting earnings and
1. See Maria Eisland. Note, The Federal Magistrates Act: Are Defendants' Rights Violated
when Magistrates Preside over Jury Selection in Felony Cases?, 56 FORDHAM L. REV. 783, 793-
96 (1988).
2. For an analysis of the relationship between these recusal statutes, see Thomas McKevitt,
Note, The Rule of Necessity: Is Judicial Non-Disqualification Really Necessary?, 24 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 817, 822-26 (1996).
3. Federal Magistrates Act, Pub. L. No. 90-578, 82 Stat. 1107 (codified as amended at 28
U.S.C. §§ 631-639 (1994)).
4. See 28 U.S.C. § 636 (describing the jurisdiction and powers granted to a magistrate).
5. See id. § 631. See generally Thomas R. Garcia, Note, Federal Courts-In Re United
States-Should Federal Magistrates Be Delegated the Authority to Approve Electronic Surveil-
lance Applications?, 18 W. NEw ENG. L. REV. 271 (1996) (discussing the history of the Federal
Magistrates Act and cases interpreting magistrates' authority under the Act).
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deterring highly qualified people from serving.6 The Federal Magistrates Act
delegated all the powers of the commissioners to the magistrates, and addi-
tionally, granted magistrates the power to determine certain pretrial matters
and conduct preliminary hearings on post-trial motions.7 In 1976, Congress
amended the Act by expanding and clarifying the duties that magistrates could
perform s The amendment added a new clause that stated, "[a] magistrate may
be assigned such additional duties as are not inconsistent with the Constitution
and the laws of the United States." Extensive litigation followed in an at-
tempt to define the precise scope of magistrate authority.
For example, in United States v. Raddatz,'° the Supreme Court deter-
mined that a magistrate may conduct a hearing on a motion to suppress evi-
dence in a felony trial without an automatic de novo review by the district
court judge of the testimony presented." The Court emphasized that the
safeguards in the Act which allow the parties to object to the findings and
recommendations by the magistrate, will also trigger de novo review by the
district court judge. 2 Later, in Gomez v. United States, 3 the Court ad-
dressed the issue of whether a magistrate could conduct voir dire without the
consent of the defendant. 4 Because the Act does not specify that a magistrate
may conduct voir dire, the Court found that the defendant had a constitutional
right to have a district judge preside.'" Two years later, in Peretz v. United
States,6 the Court reconsidered the issue. The two cases differ in that the
defendant in Peretz expressly consented to the magistrate's authority and
failed to raise an objection until after the conviction.' The Court narrowed
the holding in Gomez to allow magistrates to conduct voir dire with the con-
sent of the defendant. 9
2. Recusal
The statutes governing recusal of a trial judge for personal bias or preju-
dice overlap substantively,' but differ procedurally.2' Substantively, either a
6. See Garcia, supra note 5, at 278.
7. 28 U.S.C. § 636.
8. See Act of Oct. 21, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-577, 90 Stat. 2729 (1976) (codified as
amended at 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)).
9. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(3).
10. 447 U.S. 667 (1980).
11. Raddatz, 447 U.S. at 673-84.
12. ld. at 680-81. For a constitutional analysis of Raddatz, see Eisland, supra note 1, at 788-
96.
13. 490 U.S. 858 (1989).
14. Gomez, 490 U.S. at 861-62; see also Eisland, supra note 1 (discussing the constitutional
issues involved when a magistrate presides over the jury selection in a felony case).
15. Gomez, 490 U.S. at 874-76.
16. 501 U.S. 923 (1991).
17. Peretz, 501 U.S. at 924-25.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 933.
20. Section 144 provides:
Whenever a party to any proceeding in a district court makes and files a timely and
sufficient affidavit that the judge before whom the matter is pending has a personal bias
or prejudice either against him or in favor of any adverse party, such judge shall proceed
no further therein, but another judge shall be assigned to hear such proceeding.
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§ 144 or § 455 motion challenges the impartiality of the presiding judge,'
but procedurally, only a § 455 motion allows a sua sponte recusal. 2 General-
ly, the recusal motion is based on bias from an extrajudicial source, such as
personal knowledge of the evidentiary facts or a personal relationship with a
party or attorney in the case.24 After filing a § 455 motion, the judge whose
impartiality is questioned issues a decision. If the judge determines that the
facts warrant recusal, another judge is assigned to the proceeding;' if the
judge denies the motion, the decision is immediately reviewable by the appel-
late court to determine whether the trial judge abused his discretion.'
In Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisition Corp.,' the Supreme Court
established the proper inquiry to determine whether a judgment should be
28 U.S.C. § 144 (1994). Section 455(b) states:
He shall also disqualify himself in the following circumstances:
(1) Where he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or personal
knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding;
(2) Where in private practice he served as lawyer in the matter in controversy,
or a lawyer with whom he previously practiced law served during such associ-
ation as a lawyer concerning the matter, or the judge or such lawyer has been
a material witness concerning it;
(3) Where he has served in governmental employment and in such capacity
participated as counsel, advisor or material witness concerning the proceeding
or expressed an opinion concerning the merits of the particular case in contro-
versy;
(4) He knows that he, individually or as a fiduciary, or his spouse or minor
child residing in his household, has a financial interest in the subject matter in
controversy or in a party to the proceeding, or any other interest that could be
substantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding;
(5) He or his spouse, or a person within the third degree of relationship to
either of them, or the spouse of such a person:
(i) Is a party to the proceeding, or an officer, director, or trustee of a
party;
(ii) Is acting as a lawyer in the proceeding;
(iii) Is known by the judge to have an interest that could be substan-
tially affected by the outcome of the proceeding;
(iv) Is to the judge's knowledge likely to be a material witness in the
proceeding.
28 U.S.C. § 455(b). See generally Amy J. Shimek, Professional Responsibility Survey: Recusal,
73 DEN . U. L. REv. 903, 903-05 (1996) (discussing § 455 and Tenth Circuit decisions interpret-
ing this provision).
21. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 144 (requiring a motion for recusal to be filed at least ten days
before the beginning of the term during which the proceeding is to be heard) with 28 U.S.C. § 455
(providing no explicit time limitation on filing a motion). See also James Oleske, Authority of the
Trial Judge, 84 GEo. LJ. 1179, 1179-85 (1996) (dicussing § 144 and § 455).
While § 455 provides no explicit time limitation, the Tenth Circuit has required this motion
to be made in a timely manner. See Willner v. University of Kan., 848 F.2d 1020, 1022-23 (10th
Cir. 1988); see also Shimek, supra note 20, at 913-15.
22. See supra note 20.
23. See 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (stating that a judge "shall disqualify himself in any proceeding
in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned").
24. See 28 U.S.C. § 455(b); see also David Blanck, The Appearance of Justice Revisited, 86
J. Cium. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 887, 908-11 (1996) (detailing the debate among federal courts of
appeal regarding whether § 455(a) is subject to an extrajudicial source limitation).
25. See El Fenix de P.R. v. The M/Y Johanny, 36 F.3d 136, 141-42 (1st Cir. 1994) (holding
that a judge may not reconsider her recusal order, but only tansfer the case to another judge).
26. See also Oleske, supra note 21, at 1185.
27. 486 U.S. 847 (1988).
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vacated based on the trial judge's failure to recuse himself when appropri-
ate.' The reviewing court must consider "the risk of injustice to the parties
in the particular case, the risk that the denial of relief will produce injustice in
other cases, and the risk of undermining the public's confidence in the judicial
process."' Recently, the Supreme Court rejected the doctrine that only extra-
judicial sources can support a bias determination," and conceded that recusal
may be warranted by a display of judicial bias or prejudice within the court-
room.
31
B. Tenth Circuit Decisions
1. United States v. Ciapponi32
a. Facts
Defendant George M. Ciapponi was arrested at a border checkpoint in
New Mexico when authorities discovered ten kilograms of marijuana in the
vehicle Ciapponi was driving. 33 Ciapponi's court-appointed attorney arranged
a plea bargain with the government in which Ciapponi exchanged a guilty plea
for a reduced sentence. 4 The district court judge assigned to the case desig-
nated a magistrate to hear and accept Ciapponi's plea. 35 At the hearing,
Ciapponi waived his right to enter his guilty plea before a district judge, and
proceeded to enter his plea before the magistrate.' However, at his sentenc-
ing hearing before the district judge, Ciapponi received a higher sentence due
to his criminal history.37 He appealed on the basis that the magistrate judge
did not have the jurisdiction to accept his plea.38
b. Decision
The Tenth Circuit analyzed Ciapponi's challenge by examining the au-
thority given to magistrate judges both statutorily by the Federal Magistrates
Act and constitutionally by Article li.39 The court noted that Congress
amended the Magistrates Act in 1976 to expand the duties of magistrate judg-
28. Liljeberg, 486 U.S. at 862-64.
29. Id. at 864.
30. Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540. 554 (1994); see also Blanck, supra note 24, at
910-23 (discussing the relationship between extrajudicial and intrajudicial source bias).
31. Liteky, 510 U.S. at 555-56 (acknowledging that although intrajudicial sources of bias are
possible, the judge in question was not biased based simply on comments he made about the peti-
tioner during a prior trial).
32. 77 F.3d 1247 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1839 (1996).





38. Id. Ciapponi also contended that the court's use of his criminal history was erroneous
because it should not have considered his two previous convictions "related" offenses. Id. at 1252-
53. The Tenth Circuit found that the two convictions did not constitute a common scheme, and the
district court made no error in counting them as separate offenses for sentencing purposes. Id.
39. Id. at 1249-52 (discussing 28 U.S.C. §§ 631-639 (1994) and Article III of the Constitu-
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es as authorized by district court judges in response to the burdens of increas-
ing caseloads.4 Ciapponi argued that the magistrate's authority to accept his
plea did not fall within the definition of delegable duties under the statute.4
Additionally, the court reviewed the constitutionality of delegating duties to a
magistrate when the defendant has the right to have a district court judge
preside at "all critical stages of a felony trial."'2
The Tenth Circuit relied upon the United States Supreme Court's Peretz v.
United States decision in holding that a magistrate's expanded duties do not
violate the statute or the Constitution when the defendant expressly consents to
a magistrate's authority."3 The court found it significant that Ciapponi did not
object to the use of the magistrate, move to withdraw his plea, or request
review of the plea proceeding by the district court." The court also held that
there is no requirement for the district court to review the plea proceedings
conducted by a magistrate unless the defendant raises an objection or requests
review.'
2. Nichols v. Alley'
a. Facts
On April 19, 1995, a bomb destroyed the Murrah Federal Building in
Oklahoma City.' The massive explosion killed 169 people, and caused se-
vere damage and injuries in the vicinity of the federal building.' Terry
Nichols, and co-defendant Timothy McVeigh, were charged with the explosion
in an eleven count indictment that included eight counts of first degree mur-
der.' The first issue decided by the Tenth Circuit in the highly publicized
"Oklahoma City Bombing Case" involved defendant Terry Nichols' writ of
mandamus petition for the disqualification of all judges of the Western District
of Oklahoma, including the assigned judge, Wayne Alley. ° The explosion
damaged Judge Alley's courtroom and offices, although Judge Alley sustained
no injuries and was not personally acquainted with any of the deceased vic-
tims." Both Nichols and McVeigh filed motions for recusal of Judge Alley,
who denied the motions. 2 Nichols then filed a petition for a writ of manda-
mus with the Tenth Circuit for the purpose of disqualifying Judge Alley, as
40. Id. at 1250.
41. Id.
42. Id
43. Id. at 1250-52 (discussing Peretz v. United States, 501 U.S. 923 (1991), which held a
magistrate judge may preside over jury selection of a felony case with the defendant's consent).
44. Id. at 1251 (comparing Ciapponi's situation to that in United States v. Williams, 23 F.3d
629 (2d Cir. 1994), which held a magistrate may accept a defendant's plea with his consent even
when the defendant challenged the magistrate's authority before the district judge and moved to
withdraw his plea).
45. Id.
46. 71 F.3d 347 (10th Cir. 1995).
47. Nichols, 71 F.3d at 349.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 350.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 349-50.
52. Id. at 350.
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well as all judges in the Western District of Oklahoma, or alternatively, to
order that Judge Alley hold an evidentiary hearing for the recusal motions.'




The Tenth Circuit found that the reasonable appearance of bias mandated
Judge Alley's recusal from the case.55 After analyzing the legal standards
governing mandamus,' the court addressed the statutory authority of
Nichols's argument.57 The statute requires the disqualification of a judge
when the judge fails an objective test of the appearance of impartiality." The
inquiry turns on the factual basis of the case and any outward appearance of
bias, not on the specific judge's "actual state of mind, purity of heart, incor-
ruptibility, or lack of partiality." 9
The government argued that recusal was not required when the judge's
bias was not reasonably questionable.' The court rejected these arguments
due to the unique and extraordinary facts surrounding this case, and noted that
the law favors recusal when the issue is a close one.6' While conceding that
Judge Alley had conducted himself in a purely professional and unbiased man-
ner, the court held that a reasonable person would question the partiality of the
judge in light of the facts surrounding the case.' The holding, however, per-
tained only to Judge Alley and the court referred the matter to the Chief Judge
of the Tenth Circuit for reassignment.'
C. Analysis
The 1976 amendments to the Federal Magistrates Act reflect the intent of
Congress to expand the authority of United States magistrates." The federal
district courts broadly interpret magistrate duties to include all proceedings
that do not violate any specific right of the defendant.' Failure of the defen-
53. Id
54. Id.
55. Id at 352.
56. Id. at 350. Mandamus requires a higher standard of review, therefore the petitioner must
show a "clear and undisputable right to relief" by demonstrating a clear abuse of discretion by the
district court and no adequate alternative for relief. Id.
57. Id at 350-52 (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (1994)). Nichols also argued that Judge
Alley's recusal was warranted by actual bias under 28 U.S.C. § 144 and prejudice under 28 U.S.C.
§ 455(b)(1), but the court did not decide these arguments in light of their holding based on 28
U.S.C. § 455(a). Id. at 351 n.1.
58. Id at 350-51.
59. Id. at 351 (quoting Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 860
(1988)).
60. Id. at 352.
61. Id. (citing United States v. Dandy, 998 F.2d 1344 (6th Cir. 1993)).
62. Id Additionally, the court found that Nichols met the increased burden required of those
petitioning for mandamus relief. Id. See also supra note 56 (discussing the standard of review for
a writ of mandamus).
63. Nichols, 71 F.3d at 352-53.
64. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
65. See Peretz v. United States, 501 U.S. 923 (1991); Gomez v. United States, 490 U.S. 858
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dant to consent to magistrate authority provides the only limitation to the mag-
istrate presiding over the case.'t
The circuit courts are reluctant to order a trial judge's recusal due to per-
sonal bias or prejudice.' This year, the Tenth Circuit overcame this reluc-
tance in part due to the enormous publicity of the Oklahoma City Bombing
trial.
D. Other Circuits
In determining the powers of magistrate judges under the Federal Magis-
trates Act, the Ninth Circuit ruled that magistrates lack the power to conduct
probation revocation hearings without the express consent of the defendant.'
In general, magistrates may assume limited power, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
636(b)(3), without the consent of the parties if the power relates to procedural
or administrative matters.'
Other circuits are reluctant to grant a recusal motion to disqualify the trial
judge, especially in instances where the foundation of the defendant's argu-
ment for recusal is the judge's connection to the defendant's previous, unre-
lated trial, or in the case of a retrial, the fact that the judge presided over the
defendant's first trial."' The Second Circuit established a procedural rule that
a defendant who entered an unconditional guilty plea could still appeal an
order denying his motion for recusal.7 The Eighth Circuit, however, allowed
the recusal of the trial judge in another highly publicized trial, United States v.
Tucker.72 This case involved the prosecution of the governor of Arkansas was
prosecuted for tax fraud, bankruptcy fraud, making false material statements,
and conspiracy." The court disqualified the trial judge because to the judge's
personal relationship with Hillary Rodham Clinton, coupled with the Clintons'
support for the defendant.
4
(1989); United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667 (1980).
66. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
67. See infra note 74 and accompanying text.
68. United States v. Colacurcio, 84 F.3d 326, 334 (9th Cir. 1996).
69. See Colacurcio, 84 F.3d at 332-33; see also supra notes 7-9 and accompanying text.
70. See United States v. Thompson, 76 F.3d 442, 450-51 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding that a trial
judge is not required to recuse himself when he worked in the U.S. Attorney's office prior to the
defendant's previous prosecution); United States v. Wilson, 77 F.3d 105, 110-11 (5th Cir. 1996)
(holding that recusal was not warranted because the trial judge presided over the trial of the co-
defendants and had made rulings on the same motions brought by the defendant); United States v.
Mizell, 88 F.3d 288, 298-300 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. CL 620 (1996) (holding that the trial
judge was not required to recuse himself from the defendant's retrial simply because the judge had
made adverse pre- and post-trial decisions in the defendant's earlier trial); United States v. Griffin,
84 F.3d 820, 829-31 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that recusal was not required in an attorney's con-
tempt hearing because of the judge's frustration with the attorney in the trial that led to the hear-
ing); Hook v. McDade, 89 F.3d 350, 354-55 (7th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. CL 718 (1997)
(holding that recusal was not required when the judge's wife was the opposing counsel in a civil
case against the defendant); Poland v. Stewart, No. 95-99022, 1996 WL 764695, at *47-*52 (9th
Cir. Dec. 31, 1996) (holding that the fact that the same judge presided over both trial and retrial
was insufficient to meet the standard for recusal).
71. United States v. Brinkworth, 68 F.3d 633, 638 (2d Cir. 1995).
72. 78 F.3d 1313 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. CL 76 (1996).
73. Tucker, 78 F.3d at 1316.
74. ld. at 1324-25. However, in an unrelated case, the Ninth Circuit denied the recusal mo-
1997]
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H. FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE
A. Background
The Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States pro-
vides that no person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws." In the
landmark case of Griffin v. Illinois,"' the United States Supreme Court held
that practices in the criminal justice system which result in discrimination
against defendants based on their inability to pay violate the Equal Protection
Clause." Following Griffin, indigent defendants have frequently invoked the
Equal Protection Clause to challenge unfair practices, and the Supreme Court
has usually invalidated those practices."'
While most states allow persons convicted of lesser crimes to choose
imprisonment as an alternative to paying a fine, 9 the Supreme Court first
decided the issue of imprisonment beyond the statutory maximum in Williams
v. Illinois." The Court found it unconstitutional to imprison a defendant lon-
ger than the maximum punishment allowed for a crime because of an inability
to pay a fine."' However, the fact that an indigent person may be imprisoned
longer than a non-indigent person convicted of the same offense does not
violate the Equal Protection Clause.' The Court concluded that the Constitu-
tion required this ruling and that adequate alternative methods for satisfying
the state's interest in enforcing the fine justified the decision. 3
tion in United States v. Treiber, 84 F.3d 1549, 1559-60 (9th Cir.), cert. denied 117 S. CL 267
(1996), which was brought because of the judge's published views on legal issues.
75. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
76. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
77. Griffin, 351 U.S. at 19. Specifically, the Court declared that an indigent defendant is
entitled to receive trial transcripts at public expense when required for appeals. Id.
78. See generally David A. Harris, The Constitution and Truth Seeking: A New Theory on
Expert Services for Indigent Defendants, 83 J. CIUM. L. & CRIMiOLOGY 469 (1992) (advocating
a "truth-seeking theory" as a way to determine if indigents are entitled to expert services in their
defense); Fred Lautz, Note, Equal Protection and Revocation of an Indigent's Probation for Fail-
ure to Meet Monetary Conditions: Bearden v. Georgia, 1985 Wis. L. REv. 121 (1985) (analyzing
the effect of the Court's decision on the financial conditions a trial court can impose when setting
probation for indigents); Michael James Todd, Case Note, Criminal Procedure - Due Process
and Indigent Defendants: Extending Fundamental Fairness to Include the Right to Expert Assis-
tance, 29 How. LJ. 609 (1986) (applauding the Supreme Court's decision to expand indigent's
rights to include a right to a psychiatric evaluation when there has been a showing that insanity is
an issue).
79. Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 239-40 (1970).
80. Id. at 235, 236. See generally Joseph L. Hendrickson, Note, The Use of Uncounseled
Misdemeanor Convictions to Enhance a Penalty for a Subsequent Offense After Nichols v. United
States, 39 ST. Louis U. LJ. 669 (1995) (analyzing recent Supreme Court decisions dealing with
the collateral use of uncounseled convictions in setting standards); The Supreme Court, 1982
Term-Criminal Sentencing of Indigents, 97 HARv. L. REv. 86 (1983) (analyzing the Supreme
Court's Court's Bearden decision and concluding that the Court's analysis of indigent rights in the
judicial process had shifted from a focus on equal protection to fundamental fairness).
81. Williams, 399 U.S. at 240-41.
82. Id. at 243.
83. Id. at 244-45.
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B. Hall v. Furlong"
1. Facts
Defendant James Edward Hall was arrested for violating Colorado law
and confined to jail in August, 1977.' Because of his indigency, Hall was
not able to post bail, and remained confined until his sentencing hearing for a
total of 219 days. 6 Hall pleaded guilty to first degree sexual assault and re-
ceived the maximum authorized sentence of twenty-seven to fifty years."
Hall moved to obtain credit for time served prior to sentencing." The state
trial court granted him an eighty-four day credit applicable to Hall's minimum
sentence, but no credit toward Hall's maximum sentence.'9 Hall filed a writ
of habeas corpus ° as a pro se petitioner, and the district court determined
that no justiciable controversy existed.9' Hall then appealed to the Tenth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals.
2. Decision
The Tenth Circuit reviewed the denial of the writ of habeas corpus and
found in favor of granting presentence confinement credit to Hall.' The issue
before the court was whether denying credit to an indigent prisoner violated
the prisoner's rights to equal protection and due process under the Fourteenth
Amendment.93 In its decision, the court relied on the Supreme Court's rule
from Williams v. Illinois which determined that the Equal Protection Clause
requires that maximum authorized sentences for any crime be the same for all
defendants regardless of their economic status." The court noted that other
circuits had previously applied the rule in Williams to factually similar situa-
tions,9" although the Tenth Circuit had not previously done so.' Referring to
the rulings of the other circuits, the court held that Hall must receive full cred-
it for presentence incarceration due to his indigency as mandated by the Equal
Protection Clause.'
84. 77 F.3d 361 (10th Cir. 1996).
85. Hall, 77 F.3d at 362.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 362-63.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 363.
90. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1994).
91. Hall, 77 F.3d at 363.
92. Id. at 364.
93. Id. at 363.
94. Id. at 363 (citing Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 240-41 (1970)).
95. Id. (citing Johnson v. Riveland, 855 F.2d 1477, 1484 n.7 (10th Cir. 1988)).
96. Id. In particular, the Hall court observed that in Vasquez v. Cooper, 862 F.2d 250 (.10th
Cir. 1988), the court did not extend the rule in Williams to apply to indigent defendants who re-
ceived less than the statutory maximum term, and declined to determine whether the rule would
apply to those who did receive the maximum. Hall, 77 F.3d at 363.
97. Hall, 77 F.3d at 364. The court also analyzed the district court's denial of the habeas
corpus petition. The district court denied his petition because Hall could be released before serving
the maximum sentence. Id. The court found that the district court too narrowly applied the rule
from Williams. Id. It reasoned that early release did not have any relevance to the constitutional
issue at hand. Id. Furthermore, under the district court's analysis, Hall would have to exceed the
statutory maximum for his sentence before bringing the petition. Id. at 363-64.
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C. Analysis
Given the large number of indigent criminal defendants, the courts must
regularly analyze whether procedural discrimination constitutes a violation of
the Equal Protection Clause." Although the factual circumstances differ in
the various cases, courts appear to have settled the issue by deciding whether
the result would be the same if the defendant was able to pay. As evidenced
by Hall, the Tenth Circuit followed this test as it related to the ability to post
bail.
D. Other Circuits
Other circuits have upheld the rights of indigent defendants under the
Equal Protection Clause. The Sixth Circuit ruled that a defendant's equal pro-
tection rights were violated when the court denied the defense counsel access
to the transcripts from the defendant's two previous trials due to an inability to
pay, and only provided access to the court reporter's tapes." The Ninth Cir-
cuit found that a court's enhancement of a defendant's criminal history points,
due to the defendant's inability to pay fines from a previous conviction, violat-
ed the defendant's rights absent a showing of willful failure to pay." The
Seventh Circuit, however, ruled that awarding costs against an indigent
prisoner who has filed numerous civil lawsuits is permissible."'
The Ninth Circuit rejected a defendant's equal protection claim when the
court denied the defendant presentence credit after sentencing for one convic-
tion, but before sentencing for another.'" The court noted that indigent de-
fendants are entitled to presentence confinement credit, but only upon a show-
ing that the defendant could have been released from custody if not for the
inability to pay. 03
El. SELF-INCRIMINATING STATEMENTS
A. Background
The Fifth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States provides
that no person "shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself."'" Thus, self-incriminating statements procured through government
coercion are excluded from evidence. Five criteria must exist in order for the
defendant to invoke the privilege: "(1) the privilege must be personal to the
individual; (2) the proceeding must be criminal or have criminal consequences;
(3) the information must be self-incriminating; (4) the information must be
98. See Harris, supra note 75, at 474-91.
99. Riggins v. Rees, 74 F.3d 732, 737-38 (6th Cir. 1996).
100. United States v. Parks, 89 F.3d 570, 572 (9th Cir. 1996).
101. Montgomery v. Meloy, 90 F.3d 1200, 1206 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. CL 266
(1996); See also FED. R. Civ. P. 54(d) (allowing costs to be awarded to the prevailing party in a
civil lawsuit).
102. Robinson v. Marshall, 66 F.3d 249, 250-51 (9th Cir. 1995).
103. Robinson, 66 F.3d at 250.
104. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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compelled by the government; and (5) the information must be testimonial in
nature."'"6 A defendant may invoke the privilege at all stages of the criminal
process including circumstances prior to arrest triggered by custodial interroga-
tion.10
Courts frequently address the issue of defining protected, self-incriminat-
ing statements. The Supreme Court held in Simmons v. United States,"7 that
although a defendant may choose to waive his Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination at any time, conflicting laws cannot compel him to
choose between that right and another constitutional privilege." More spe-
cifically, the Court determined that a defendant's testimony at a pretrial hear-
ing for a motion to suppress evidence is inadmissible at trial.'0 9 In contrast,
the Court held in Crampton v. Ohio"' that a defendant's allocution statement
made at the penalty phase may be used against the defendant regarding issues
of guilt."' Because the defendant may voluntarily choose whether to make
any statement at sentencing, allocution statements fall outside the scope of the
Fifth Amendment. 2
The issue of Fifth Amendment protection becomes more complicated
when the defendant enters into a plea agreement with the prosecution. Federal
Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 (e)(6) provides that the statements made during
plea negotiations are generally inadmissible in a proceeding against the defen-
dant."3 Courts, however, analogize a final plea agreement with a contract,
and if violated, the terms are void and the incriminating statements are admis-
sible against the defendant. In United States v. Mezzanatto,"4 the Supreme
Court held that a defendant may voluntarily waive the plea agreement rules for
the purposes of impeachment without violating the defendant's Fifth
Amendment privilege."'
105. Survey of Recent Cases, 44 U. KAN. L. REv. 895, 917-18 (1996); see also Michael A.
Conner, Comment, The Constitutional Framework Limiting Compelled Voice Exemplars: Explora-
tion of the Current Constitutional Boundaries of Governmental Power over a Criminal Defendant,
33 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 349, 360-65 (1996) (reviewing traditional rationales for limiting compelled
exemplars and proposing new rationales). See generally Albert W. Alschuler, A Peculiar Privilege
in Historical Perspective: The Right to Remain Silent, 94 MicH. L. REv. 2625 (1996) (contrasting
modem views regarding the rule against self-incrimination with historical perspectives); Akhil
Reed Amar & Renee B. Lettow, Fifth Amendment First Principles: The Self-Incrimination Clause,
93 MCH. L. REV. 857 (1995) (analyzing prior interpretations of the Self-Incrimination Clause and
offering new views); John H. Langbein, Essay, The Historical Origins of the Privilege Against
Self-Incrimination at Common Law, 92 MIcH. L. REv. 1047 (1994) (critiquing prior scholarly
analysis as to how and when the privilege against self-incrimination arose); Mary A. Shein, Com-
ment, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination Under Siege: Asherman v. Meachum, 59 BROOK.
L. REv. 503 (1993) (criticizing the Second Circuit's decision in Asherman as incompatible with
the Supreme Court's broad judicial interpretation of the Self-Incrimination Clause).
106. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444-45 (1966).
107. 390 U.S. 377 (1968).
108. Simmons, 390 U.S. at 394.
109. Id
110. 402 U.S. 183 (1971).
111. Crampton, 402 U.S. at 216-17.
112. Id.
113. FED. R. CRum. P. 1l(e)(6).
114. 115 S. Ct. 797 (1995).
115. Mezzanatto, 115 S. Ct at 800. See also Michael S. Gershowitz, Note, Waiver of the
Plea-Statement Rules, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1439 (1996) (arguing that the Supreme
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B. Tenth Circuit Decisions
1. United States v. Hardwell"6
a. Facts
Defendant Marcel Hardwell was convicted of conspiracy and money laun-
dering after a Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) investigation implicated him
and six other defendants." 7 The DEA sting occurred when an undercover
agent arranged to buy two kilograms of cocaine from the defendants, including
Hardwell."' The evidence supporting the money laundering conviction sug-
gested that Hardwell had insufficient legitimate income to purchase the co-
caine, leading to the inference that he procured the money through drug distri-
bution." 9 On appeal, Hardwell argued that because the government's infor-
mation regarding his lack of income came solely from financial affidavits that
he was compelled to provide in order to establish his eligibility for court-ap-
pointed counsel, the unintended use of this information violated his Fifth
Amendment right against self-incrimination and his Sixth Amendment right to
counsel."2
b. Decision
The Tenth Circuit reversed Hardwell's conviction for money laundering
due to the violation of his constitutional right against self-incrimination. 2 '
The Supreme Court has ruled that it is unconstitutional to require a defendant
to choose between his Fifth Amendment right to silence and his Fourth
Amendment protection from illegal search and seizure.'" The conflict at
issue, however, presented a matter of first impression for the Tenth Cir-
cuit.' The court noted that other circuits have extended some types of pro-
tection to disclosures made for determining financial eligibility for counsel, but
usually through a pretrial protection hearing. 24 The Tenth Circuit, in United
Court's decision in Mezzanatto undermines the rule that a criminal defendant's plea negotiations
are inadmissible); Waiver - Plea Negotiation Statements, 109 HARv. L. REv. 249 (1995) (con-
tending that in its Mezzanatto decision, the Supreme Court created a de facto rule of waivability
with regard to a criminal defendant's right to have plea negotiations held inadmissible).
116. 80F.3d 1471 (10th Cir. 1996).
117. Hardwell, 80 F.3d at 1479. Of the other six defendants implicated with Hardwell, three
defendants were acquitted, two were convicted of conspiracy, and one was convicted of conspira-
cy, money laundering, and possession of cocaine with intent to distribute. Id.
118. Id. at 1479-83.
119. Id. at 1483. For the elements of money laundering, see 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(AXi)
(1994).
120. ld. Hardwell argued unsuccessfully that there was insufficient evidence to support his
conviction for money laundering; id. at 1482-83; double jeopardy violations with regard to his
prosecution for money laundering and conspiracy to distribute cocaine, id. at 1484-85; abuse of
discretion by the court in admitting evidence of prior bad acts and irrelevant evidence, id. at 1488-
89, 1492; ineffective assistance of counsel, id. at 1495; and incorrect determination of drug quan-
tity for the purpose of sentencing. Id. at 1496-98.
121. Id. at 1484.
122. Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 394 (1968).
123. Hardwell, 80 F.3d at 1483-84.
124. Id. (citing United States v. Pavelko, 992 F.2d 32, 34-35 (3d Cir. 1993); United States v.
Hitchcock, 992 F.2d 236, 239 (9th Cir. 1993); United States v. Gravatt, 868 F.2d 585, 589-92 (3d
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States v. Peister,'" had previously rejected the pretrial protection approach,
but declined to resolve the issue of whether the use of a defendant's financial
statement violates the Fifth Amendment, because the prosecution did not use
the financial information at tria1.'" In Hardwell, in which the information
was used against the defendant at trial, the court held that Hardwell's Fifth
Amendment rights were violated, and that the error was sufficiently prejudi-
cial as to require reversal.1"




Defendant Jetty Lee Harvey was convicted in Wyoming state court for
kidnapping and first degree sexual assault."n At sentencing, Harvey chose to
make an allocution statement in mitigation of his punishment, and in doing so,
admitted to details of the crime.'O The Wyoming Supreme Court vacated the
conviction for violations of the defendant's right to a speedy trial. 3' Subse-
quently, the government charged and convicted Harvey of conspiracy to com-
mit kidnapping and conspiracy to commit sexual assault for the same offend-
ing acts. 3 2 The prosecution used the allocution statement Harvey made at his
first sentencing hearing as evidence against him.'33 Harvey filed a writ of ha-
beas corpus in federal district court, which the court dismissed." On appeal
from the dismissal, Harvey argued that the use of his allocution statement
violated his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. 3 '
b. Decision
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Harvey's petition for a writ of
habeas corpus." The State of Wyoming recognizes that statements made in
mitigation of punishment are constitutionally protected, but federal law does
not protect allocution statements, and federal law must support the habeas
Cir. 1989); United States v. Sarsoun, 834 F.2d 1358, 1363-64 (7th Cir. 1987); United States v.
Harris, 707 F.2d 653, 662-63 (2d Cir. 1983)).
125. 631 F.2d 658 (10th Cir. 1980).
126. Hardwell, 80 F.3d at 1484 (citing Peister, 631 F.2d at 661-62).
127. Id. Following this holding, co-defendant Dennis Hardwell appealed his conviction of
money laundering on the same grounds, and based on the new rule developed in Marcel
Hardwell's reversal, the Tenth Circuit reversed Dennis Hardwell's conviction. United States v.
Hardwell, 88 F.3d 897, 898 (10th Cir. 1996).
128. 76 F.3d 1528 (10th Cir. 1996).
129. Harvey, 76 F.3d at 1531.
130. Id. at 1531-32.
131. Id. at 1531.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 1532.
134. Id. (citing Harvey v. Shillinger (Harvey 111), 893 F. Supp. 1021 (D. Wyo. 1995)).
135. Id. Harvey also appealed on the grounds that his conspiracy conviction violated double
jeopardy, the Sixth Amendment right to speedy trial, and the Sixth Amendment right to effective
assistance of counsel because he had not been advised that his allocution statement could later be
used against him. Id.
136. Id. at 1537.
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corpus petition.'37 In forming its opinion, the Tenth Circuit examined
whether the government violated Harvey's due process rights by forcing him
to choose between his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent and his statuto-
ry right to speak on his own behalf at sentencing. 3 The court relied on the
Supreme Court case of Crampton v. Ohio,39 which held that pressuring a
defendant into making an allocution statement during the punishment phase of
trail did not violate the defendant's Fifth Amendment rights. 4 ' Because
Harvey freely chose to make a statement at sentencing, the court held there
was no due process violation. 4' Harvey's choice to testify on his own behalf
constituted "an effective waiver of his Fifth Amendment" right against self-
incrimination. 42 Additionally, the court found it irrelevant that Harvey did
not understand that his statement could be used against him because no consti-
tutional right requires knowledge of the consequences of waiver. 43
3. United States v. Watkins' 44
a. Facts
Defendant Carlton J. Watkins was arrested and indicted for conspiracy to
distribute and distributing crack cocaine.4 Watkins entered into a plea
agreement with the government in which he agreed to reveal his source for the
crack cocaine in exchange for supervised release to a halfway house.' 4 The
agreement also provided that the government would not bring a case against
Watkins unless he violated the terms of the agreement." During the negotia-
tions, the government informed Watkins that his statements were protected by
Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.' 48 Subsequent to enter-
ing into the plea agreement, Watkins spoke with agents at the DEA office and
repeated his earlier incriminating statements, which included the fact that he
had sold crack cocaine and provided the identity of his source.' The day
following his meeting with the DEA agents, Watkins escaped from the half-
way house, thus violating the terms of the agreement." The government
prosecuted Watkins for conspiracy and distribution of crack cocaine, using the
incriminating statements made during the plea negotiations and later at the
DEA office.' 5 The district court suppressed the first statements made during
137. Id. at 1534.
138. Id. at 1534-35.
139. 402 U.S. 183 (1971).
140. Harvey, 76 F.3d at 1535 (citing Crampton, 402 U.S. at 217); see supra notes 108-09 and
accompanying text.
141. Id. at 1536-37.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 1536 (citing Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564, 574 (1987)).
144. 85 F.3d 498 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 269 (1996).
145. Watkins, 85 F.3d at 499. 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) & 846 are the relevant statutes in viola-
tion.
146. Watkins, 85 F.3d at 499.
147. Id.
148. Id. See generally FED. R. CRIM. P. II (providing the rules regarding pleas).





negotiations, pursuant to Rule 1 l(e)(6), but allowed the statements made at the
DEA office to be used against Watkins at trial."2
b. Decision
The Tenth Circuit analyzed the purpose and language of Rule 11 (e)(6) and
found that any and all statements made after the finalization of the plea agree-
ment are admissible in court."3 The court stated that the language of the rule
protects statements made "in the course of plea discussions with an attorney
for the government.' ' 54 The rule is designed to stimulate free and open nego-
tiations between the defendant and the opposing counsel without fear of reper-
cussions."' Noting that other circuits have applied the rule in similar factual
situations, the court held that Watkins's subsequent statements were not pro-
tected since Watkins made the statements after the finalization of the plea
agreement.56 Watkins also argued for the protection of the statements due to
the fact that they were similar to the information given during the protected
negotiations.'57 The court rejected this argument with the reasoning that sub-
sequent statements, regardless of whether they are identical, are beyond the
scope of the rule.'
4. United States v. Erekson
59
a. Facts
IRS Special Agent Howard contacted defendant Gene M. Erekson to dis-
cuss a business client of Erekson's who was under criminal investigation."
Erekson agreed to meet with Howard at the IRS office at which time Erekson
gave a tape recorded interview, voluntarily answering certain questions, and
choosing not to answer others.' 6' Approximately eighteen months after the
interview, a grand jury indicted Erekson for conspiracy to defraud the IRS."6
Erekson argued for the exclusion of the statements he made during the inter-
view with Special Agent Howard because the IRS had not given Erekson
Miranda warnings prior to the interview."' The district court relied on the
conclusions of a magistrate's evidentiary hearing to find that the circumstances
152. l
153. Id. at 500-01. See generally Anjili Soni & Michael E. McCann, Guilty Pleas, 84 GEO.
.J. 1039 (1996) (providing an in depth review of the case law involving Rule 11).
154. Id. at 500 (quoting FED. R. CRIM. P. 1 l(e)(6)(D)).
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id In addition, Watkins argued that the contractual language of the agreement protected
the use of his subsequent statements. Id. The court quickly rejected this claim because of the con-
ditional sentence that voids the agreement on any violations of its terms. Id.
158. Id.
159. 70 F.3d 1153 (10th Cir. 1995).
160. Erekson, 70 F.3d at 1154.
161. Id. at 1155.
162. Id. at 1154. Erekson was also indicted for presenting a false social security number, but
that count is not at issue in this appeal. Id.
163. Id. at 1156.
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did not necessitate a Miranda warning.' Erekson was subsequently convict-
ed of the charges, and he appealed the denial of his motion to suppress state-
ments.
b. Decision
The Tenth Circuit adopted the findings from the evidentiary hearing to
hold that Erekson's interview with Special Agent Howard did not meet the
requirements for a Miranda warning." Erekson argued that the circumstanc-
es required a Miranda warning because the IRS agents knew that the nature of
the questions would illicit incriminating responses.'67 The court concluded
that Erekson voluntarily made the statements, based on the fact that he was
not forced to answer questions,'" the environment was not coercive,'6 the
interview was not excessively long, 7 and Erekson's personal characteristics
did not make him susceptible to coercion. 7' Additionally, Erekson argued
that his statements were involuntary and inadmissible because the IRS agents
induced his statements by deceit.'" The court stated that statements are ob-
tained through deceit when the "agents affirmatively mislead [a suspect] as to
the true nature of their investigation."'73 Erekson himself was not under in-
vestigation at the time of his interview, and the investigation did not focus on
him until after he made those incriminating statements.' The court conclud-
ed that Erekson voluntarily made the statements, warranting them admissible,
and that the facts did not require a Miranda warning."
,C. Analysis
Courts have struggled with the issue of protecting self-incriminating state-
ments, with varied results. The Tenth Circuit adhered to the approach that as-
sumes the defendant knowingly and voluntarily chooses to waive his Fifth
164. Id. at 1155-56.
165. Id. Additionally, Erekson argued that the statements obtained during the interview vio-
lated his Fourth Amendment protection of unreasonable search and seizure but the court deter-
mined that a Fifth Amendment analysis was more appropriate. Id. at 1157-58.
166. Id at 1156-58.
167. Id. at 1156.
168. Id. at 1157. The court noted that Erekson chose not to answer six questions for fear they
might incriminate him. Id.
169. Id. The court explained that the coercive environment would exist if the agents made
threats, intimidating gestures, or displayed their revolvers. Id.
170. Id. The interview lasted twenty minutes. Id.
171. Id. Susceptibility to coercion might result from youth, old age, lack of education, or lack
of intelligence. Id.
172. Id. at 1157.





Amendment privilege. However, the court took a pro-defendant stance, fol-
lowing the Supreme Court, in its solution to the problem of requiring a defen-
dant to choose between his constitutional protections. In such a case, the court
will not require the defendant to waive one right for the purpose of invoking
another.
D. Other Circuits
Other circuits frequently determine when incriminating statements receive
protection. These circuits have addressed the basic issue of defining "custodial
interrogation," which triggers the defendant's proper invocation of his Fifth
Amendment right to silence.'76 The Eighth Circuit decided a case factually
similar to Erekson, in which the court determined that the defendant was not
in custody when questioned by FBI agents due to the surrounding circum-
stances.'" Additionally, the circuits vary on decisions regarding whether de-
fendants have properly invoked their Fifth Amendment rights and the use of
subsequent statements.
78
Beyond the scope of custodial interrogation, the circuits have determined
which statements are protected under the rules governing immunity and plea
bargains. The Ninth Circuit decided three cases that dealt with the relationship
of protected statements and the grant of immunity.' In one of these cases,
United States v. Camp," the court held that although the defendant's state-
ments were not admissible in the trial for which the defendant received
176. See United States v. Moya, 74 F.3d 1117, 1119 (11th Cir. 1996) (holding that aliens
subjected to custodial interrogation at the United States border are entitled to Miranda warnings,
but that a Miranda warning was not required when the questioning of an alien defendant did not
constitute custodial interrogation); Sprosty v. Buchler, 79 F.3d 635, 641 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
117 S. Ct. 150 (1996) (identifying the factors to be considered for determining whether the defen-
dant was in custody for the purposes of requiring Miranda warnings); United States v. Ventura, 85
F.3d 708, 710-12 (1st Cir. 1996) (defining the conclusive meanings of "custody" and "interroga-
tion" for the purposes of requiring Miranda warnings).
177. United States v. McKinney, 88 F.3d 551, 554-55 (8th Cir. 1996); see supra notes 156-
172 and accompanying text.
178. See United States v. Ramirez, 79 F.3d 298, 305 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 140
(1996) (holding that when the defendant chooses not to answer certain questions but agrees to
answer others, the defendant does not invoke his Fifth Amendment right and interrogation may
continue); Pope v. Zenon, 69 F.3d 1018, 1024-25 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that the prosecution's
use at trial of defendant's confession obtained in violation of his Fifth Amendment privilege was
harmless error when the confession did not contradict the defense's theory of the case).
179. See United States v. Anderson, 79 F.3d 1522, 1529-30 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that
defendant's compelled statements in related civil trial did not grant him immunity from criminal
liability); United States v. Dudden, 65 F.3d 1461, 1467-69 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that compelled
testimony received under an informal immunity agreement may require a hearing to determine
whether the compelled testimony may be used by the government in the present prosecution); in-
fra notes 177-78 and accompanying text.
180. 72 F.3d 759 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1557 (1996).
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immunity, those statements were not protected at the sentencing of the defen-
dant for an unrelated criminal conviction.'8 The First and Fifth Circuits also
decided issues regarding Fifth Amendment privileges at pretrial hearings chal-
lenging plea agreements."
An additional issue surrounding a defendant's choice to invoke his privi-
lege against self-incrimination concerns the prosecutor's comments at trial.
Circuits' decisions vary depending on the facts and circumstances surrounding
the comments made during the trial about the defendant's silence."'
Circuits agree that a court cannot compel a defendant to submit to a men-
tal examination without violating his Fifth Amendment privileges, but the
results after the defendant consents to an examination are admissible.'" The
circuits were also uniform in determining that although the Fifth Amendment
applies to documents, there is no privilege for the compelled production of
previously voluntarily produced statements and documents."
CONCLUSION
The Tenth Circuit appears reluctant to expand the rights of criminal de-
fendants, which is consistent with the lead of the conservative United States
181. Camp, 72 F.3d at 762.
182. See United States v. Conway, 81 F3d 15, 16-17 (1st Cir. 1996) (finding that when the
defendant did not fully understand the terms of the agreement in the plea hearing and believed he
was being granted full immunity, the government violated this right against self incrimination by
using his statements against him in sentencing); United States v. Bond, 87 F.3d 695, 700 (5th Cir.
1996) (finding that defendant did not preserve the issue for appeal when he invoked his right to
remain silent in the pretrial motion hearing regarding the terms of the plea bargain because testify-
ing would effectively waive his privilege against self-incrimination); United States v. Catano, 65
F.3d 219. 224 (1st Cir. 1995) (holding the defendant is not entitled to Fifth Amendment immunity
for testifying at pretrial hearing to determine if the defendant met the terms of his plea agreement
because he was not being required to make any statements that might have been incriminating).
183. See United States v. Francis, 82 F.3d 77, 79 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2513
(1996) (holding that the government did not violate the defendant's right against self-incrimination
when the prosecutor commented that the evidence was uncontradicted); United States v. Zanabria,
74 F.3d 590, 593 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding that the prosecutor may use the defendant's silence
during his arrest questioning to rebut the defense's theory without violating the defendant's right
to remain silent); United States v. Comam, 88 F.3d 487, 499-501 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S.
CL 326 (1996) (holding that the defendant's right against self-incrimination was violated when the
prosecutor made indirect comments during closing arguments about the codefendant's failure to
take the stand); United States v. Tenorio, 69 F.3d 1103, 1107 (1lth Cir. 1995) (holding that the
prosecution may not use the defendant's silence after he was given Miranda warnings to imply
guilt); cf. United States v. Two Parcels of Real Property, 92 F.3d 1123, 1129 (1lth Cir. 1996)
(holding that in a civil case, the trier of fact may make an adverse inference from the invocation
of the privilege against self-incrimination).
184. See Savino v. Murray, 82 F.3d 593, 603-04 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1 (1996);
United States v. Davis, 93 F.3d 1286, 1295 (6th Cir. 1996).
185. See United States v. Feldman, 83 F.3d 9, 14-15 (1st Cir. 1996) (holding that there is no
Fifth Amendment protection to destroy documents that contain incriminating evidence); In re
Grand Jury Witnesses, 92 F.3d 710, 712 (8th Cir. 1996) (holding that the Fifth Amendment does
not protect the contents of a document that a person voluntarily prepared); In re Grand Jury Sub-
poena, 75 F.3d 446, 448 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that the Fifth Amendment does not protect the
production of previously compelled statements, but only protects against improper use); In re
Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 70 F.3d 521, 522 (8th Cir. 1995) (holding that there was no
violation of an attorney's privilege against self-incrimination by requiring him to produce his
business records).
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Supreme Court. Decisions from this Survey period reflect the Tenth Circuit's
position that defendants make knowing and voluntary choices for which they
are accountable, regardless of the undesirable consequences. The only excep-
tions the court has made are those where the defendant's circumstances are
beyond his control, or when the defendant must choose between two constitu-
tional privileges, thus interpreting defendant's rights rather narrowly.
Elizabeth R. Imhoff

